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Abstract Cloud-computing services are provided to con-
sumers through a network of servers and network equip-
ment. Cloud-network (CN) providers virtualize resources
(e.g., virtual machine (VM) and virtual network (VN)) for
efficient and secure resource allocation. Disasters are one
of the worst threats for CNs as they can cause massive
disruptions and CN disconnection. A disaster may also
induce post-disaster correlated, cascading failures which
can disconnect more CNs. Survivable virtual-network em-
bedding (SVNE) approaches have been studied to protect
VNs against single physical-link/-node and dual physical-
link failures in communication infrastructure, but massive
disruptions due to a disaster and their consequences can
make SVNE approaches insufficient to guarantee cloud-
computing survivability.
In this work, we study the problem of survivable CN
mapping (SCNM) from disaster. We consider risk assess-
ment, VM backup location, and post-disaster survivability
to reduce the risk of failure and probability of CN discon-
nection and the penalty paid by operators due to loss of ca-
pacity. We formulate the proposed approach as an integer
linear program and study two scenarios: a natural disaster,
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e.g., earthquake and a human-made disaster, e.g., weapons-
of-mass-destruction (WMD) attack. Our illustrative exam-
ples show that our approach reduces the risk of CN discon-
nection and penalty up to 90% compared to a baseline CN
mapping approach, and increases the CN survivability up to
100% in both scenarios.
Keywords cloud computing · disaster survivability ·
cloud-network mapping · virtual-network mapping · virtual
machine
1 Introduction
Reliable provisioning of cloud-computing services depends
on robust resource allocation over a common physical in-
frastructure, formed by datacenters and communication net-
works [2–4]. Physical infrastructure is often abstracted as
“infrastructure as a service (IaaS)” layer which provides
computational and communication resources to the upper
service layers (e.g., platform as a service (PaaS) and soft-
ware as a service (SaaS)) of the cloud-computing frame-
work [5], [6]. Cloud-network (CN) mapping is the combina-
tion of virtual-network (VN) mapping and virtual-machines
(VMs) allocation (i.e., network and server virtualization)
over a physical infrastructure. CN survivability is crucial for
computational resource allocation in a consistent and secure
environment for cloud-computing services [4, 6, 7]. Figure
1 presents an example of two CNs consisting of intercon-
nected VMs mapped over a optical network that intercon-
nects datacenters (DC) of a cloud-infrastructure provider.
Failures in the physical infrastructure can reduce the avail-
able resources (optical network and DCs) and disconnect
multiple CNs. This may severely affect the upper-layer ser-
vices [8]. CN survivability for a small number of failures
in the physical infrastructure has been modeled as a surviv-
able virtual-network embedding (SVNE) problem defined as
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Fig. 1 Cloud networks and cloud services.
the resilient VN mapping over the physical infrastructure to
avoid disconnection due to failures [9]. Most SVNE stud-
ies considered single and multiple physical-link (-node) fail-
ures (e.g., datacenter and shared-risk group (SRG)), and a
regional failure that may or may not be a disaster [9–13].
Disaster failure is an special case of SRG failure which
may produce multiple failures in cascade, i.e., when a disas-
ter occurs, some network elements may fail simultaneously
in the first phase, and, later, other failures in different parts
of the physical network (and upper layers) may occur (e.g.,
power outage, aftershocks after an earthquake, etc.). An im-
portant feature of cascading failures is that they tend to be
more predictable from the damage and location of the ini-
tial failure, and this prediction can be used to reorganize the
network to reduce disruptions [14].
An example of a disaster failure is the 2012 Hurricane
Sandy, where post-disaster cascading failures (caused by
flooding and power blackouts) shut down many datacenters
and network nodes in the New York area [15], and caused
disruption in communication services in the northeastern
US [16]. Given the scale of their impact in CNs, network
operators should take measures to protect cloud-computing
services from disaster and post-disaster failures despite their
rare occurrences.
In this study, we consider a disaster-survivable CN
mapping approach using risk assessment (similar to [17]),
virtual-machine (VM) backup location, and post-disaster
survivability constraints to substantially reduce risk of fail-
ure, penalty, and probability of CN disconnection in case of
disaster and post-disaster failures.
1.1 Main Contributions
In this work, to the best of our knowledge, we study for the
first time:
– Integration of disaster and post-disaster survivable CN
mapping with a risk-assessment model to reduce the risk
of CN disconnection.
– Use of a virtual-backup-node approach that can relocate
VMs (i.e., VM backup location) to increase the cloud-
computing survivability in case of disasters.
1.2 Organization
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2
presents a brief review on cloud-network protection schemes
and related works. Section 3 presents the survivable CN
mapping problem. Section 4 describes our approach with
an example. Sections 5 introduces the variables and sym-
bols and the ILP formulations of the baseline approach with
risk minimization objective function. Section 6 introduces
the ILP formulation of the proposed approach including VM
backup location, and post-disaster survivability constraints.
An illustrative example is presented in Section 7, and our
study concludes in Section 8.
2 Background and Related Works
A survey on network virtualization highlighting the impor-
tance of survivable virtual-network embedding (SVNE) is
presented in [18]. Ref. [14] surveyed works on disaster sur-
vivability, and pointed out works on disaster SVNE com-
bined with VM location for datacenter networks.
Most studies on the SVNE problem suggested protection
or restoration (e.g., reactive) approaches to deal with single
physical-link (-node) failure. To deal with single physical-
link failure, Ref. [19] proposed a fast rerouting approach to
recover failed VN, and Ref. [20] suggested to mix protec-
tion and restoration with backup capacity sharing to maxi-
mize revenue. Ref. [21] studied the SVNE problem for IP-
over-WDM optical networks considering single and dual-
link failures, introducing cut-disjoint as a survivability con-
straint and a routing metric MINCUT. Cut-disjoint con-
straint avoids the mapping of two virtual links on the same
physical resource if failures on both links disconnect the vir-
tual topology (i.e., a cut of the topology). Ref. [22] used
dedicated-path-protection and cut-disjoint approaches to in-
crease the survivability. Ref. [23] showed the advantage of
cut-disjoint approach over path-disjoint approach to provide
protection in VN.
Refs. [12,24] proposed two versions of SVNE approach
for physical-node failures (i.e., a datacenter failure in a re-
gional failure) by adding backup node: l-backup node (one
backup node for each VN), and k-backup nodes (1+1 node
protection). Ref. [25] presented an extension of these ap-
proaches, considering the network-flow perspective to in-
crease survivability.
Ref. [26] studied the SVNE problem in the context of
grid- and cloud-computing survivability over optical net-
works, highlighting the importance of the survivable CN
mapping (SCNM) problem which combines the SVNE
problem and VM survivability. In this regard, the study
in [13] suggested server capacity relocation and lightpath
re-provisioning for virtualized datacenters to offer surviv-
ability. Ref. [10] presented a model that helps to reduce
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the disaster failure in cloud services (i.e., cloud contents)
provisioned over optical datacenter networks using a SRG-
disjoint approach. Refs. [27, 28] studied the SCNM prob-
lem combining with anycast routing, where VN mapping
and anycast routing are optimized together to provide CN
survivability. Ref. [11] studied disaster survivability in CN
mapping, suggesting a disaster-disjoint combined with non-
survivable mapping to maximize revenue.
In this work, we address the SCNM problem for disas-
ter failures using risk minimization, cut-disjoint constraint,
virtual-machine (VM) backup location, and post-disaster
survivability approaches.
3 Survivable CN Mapping (SCNM)
The survivable CN mapping (SCNM) problem combines
SVNE and VM resiliency. To address this problem, we con-
sider a baseline SCNM approach to provide CN resiliency
for any single physical-link failure while minimizing re-
sources (Min-Res). To extend the baseline approach for dis-
aster survivability, we also consider minimization of the risk
of damage given the occurrence of a disaster (Min-Risk).
3.1 SCNM Problem Statement
Inputs:
– CN mapping requests and VM allocation requests with
required communication and processing capacity.
– Physical network with link and node capacity (i.e., data-
center capacity).
Output:
– Single physical-link failure survivable CN mapping.
Goal:
Minimize the communication resources used (i.e., wave-
length channels).
3.2 Survivable Mapping Constraint
The survivable mapping constraint guarantees a survivable
CN mapping for any single physical-link failure by enforc-
ing cut-disjoint mapping as studied in [21–23]. This con-
straint ensures that virtual links of the same cut (i.e., set
of links whose simultaneous failures disconnects the vir-
tual topology) do not share the same physical link. A simple
example of SCNM approach is shown in Fig. 2. Two CNs
are considered: CN 1 = {3, 4, 6, 7} and CN 2 = {1, 2, 5}
mapped over an optical network with physical nodes (i.e.,
optical cross-connects (OXCs) connected to routers) {A, B,
C, D, E, F, G, H}, where some physical nodes {A, B, C, F,
G, H} connect datacenters. Each virtual link is mapped us-
ing a lightpath. Figure 2(a) shows a non-survivable mapping
where, if any of the physical links (shown in circles) fails
(C - D or B - D or A - B), one or both CNs will be discon-
nected. Figure 2(b) shows an example of SCNM where no
single physical-link failure will disconnect a CN.
Fig. 2 (a) Non-survivable and (b) survivable CN mapping over a
WDM optical network.
3.3 Resource minimization (Min-Res)
The baseline objective is to minimize resource usage (Min-
Res):
min∑
γ∈Γ
(Resources used by γ) (1)
where γ represents a CN request and Γ is the set of requests.
3.4 Disaster-Survivable CN Mapping with Risk
Minimization (Min-Risk-DS)
The disaster-survivable CN mapping with risk minimization
approach (Min-Risk-DS) extends Min-Res by including a
disconnection constraint. Risk minimization offers two im-
portant advantages for the case of disaster survivability. The
first advantage is the reduction of capacity (for backup) us-
age. The second advantage is the feasibility of the map-
ping in disaster zones (DZs) where the SRG-disjoint ap-
proach will not give a feasible mapping without additional
resources for backup.
3.4.1 Risk assessment
Risk is defined as the expected value of an outcome seen as
undesirable. In this work, we analyze the risk of CN based
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on damage/loss caused by a disaster [17], as shown below:
min∑
n∈N
∑
γ∈Γ
(Loss of γ due to disaster n) pn (2)
where the loss of CN γ (γ ∈ Γ ) represents the sum of two
values: (1) the penalty for CN disconnection which is the
sum of the total disconnection penalty which represent ca-
pacity lost from the CN (i.e., total bandwidth) multiplied
by a CN disconnection coefficient (i.e., value defined in
the service-level agreement (SLA) which indicates the addi-
tional cost paid by the network provider to the customer or
tenant when their CN is disconnected), and (2) the penalty of
virtual-links disconnection in term of capacity lost. Finally,
the risk is calculated by multiplying the resulting loss (i.e.,
total penalty) of γ by the probability pn that disaster n can
occur in the given disaster zone from the set of N possible
disasters. Disasters are defined according to the approach
used in [17] where the probability of a disaster and proba-
bility of damage are calculated based on hazard maps (see
Section 7).
3.4.2 Example of risk minimization in CN mapping
To illustrate the impact of a disaster failure in CNs and the
advantage of the Min-Risk-DS approach, we compare the
mapping using Min-Res (Fig. 2(b)) with the mapping using
Min-Risk-DS (Fig. 3(a)). Two disaster zones are included in
Fig. 3, DZ1 and DZ2, with probability of occurrences (pn)
0.3 and 0.5, respectively. Since DZ1 affects an entire node
C, a SRG-disjoint approach will demand more resources for
backup. To compare the two mappings, we calculate the total
Fig. 3 (a) Min-Res approach (SCNM), (b) Disaster-survivable CN
mapping with risk minimization (Min-Risk-DS), with two DZs.
risk of CN disconnection using Eq. (2), assuming the band-
width of each virtual link is 10 Mbps and a CN disconnec-
tion coefficient of 10 (we assume a value between 1 and 10).
The risk of CNs mapped in Fig. 3(a) into the physical infras-
tructure in DZ1 is: Penalty for CN 1 disconnection, 40 Mbps
(4 virtual links of 10 Mbps each) × 10 = 400 + Penalty for
CN 2 disconnection, 30 Mbps × 10 = 300. The total risk of
CN disconnection is 700× 0.3 (p1) = 210. DZ2 does not dis-
connect any CN, hence only 20 Mbps is affected, 20 Mbps
(i.e., penalty for virtual-link disconnection)× 0.5 (p2) = 10.
Then, the total risk will be 220.
Similarly, we can calculate the risk of CN mapping in
Fig. 3(b) which is 210. The mappings of Figs. 3(a) and 3(b)
use the same amount of resources (i.e., 120 Mbps each).
However, the risk minimization can force the use of more
resources in case of having more DZs. Hence, in this ex-
ample, we confirm the necessity of VM backup location for
further reduction of the risk of CN disconnection which is
introduced in Section 4.
4 Disaster and Post-Disaster Survivable CN Mapping
with Risk Minimization (Min-Risk-D-PDS)
Min-Risk-D-PDS extends Min-Risk-DS by adding two new
functions to increase the disaster and post-disaster surviv-
ability of CNs. Note that, in the mapping of Fig. 3(b), the
risk is reduced by 10 units only and a disaster in DZ1 can
still disconnect both CNs. To reduce the risk and increase
CN survivability for case of disaster failures, Min-Risk-D-
PDS introduces the concept of VM backup location (VBL)
and post-disaster survivability (PDS).
4.1 Virtual Backup Node for VM Backup Location (VBL)
VBR maps one or more virtual backup node to relocate VMs
of a CN, following three main steps: selection, connection,
and sharing. For comparative purpose, we use the CN 1
nodes (3, 4, 6, 7) already used in Fig. 3 with one and two
VM backup location (Fig. 4). These three steps are the main
novelty and advantages of our proposed VBL approach over
previous works in [11, 12, 25], in which risk of disaster and
post-disaster survivability are not considered.
4.1.1 Selection of datacenter for VM backup location
The physical node (i.e., datacenter) selected as backup must
not only have enough excess processing capacity but also
should be located in a safer place to lower the risk of dis-
connection.
4.1.2 Connectivity of VM backup location
Every virtual backup node has to be connected using one vir-
tual link to a set of working VMs in its own CN (Fig. 4(a)).
The virtual links which connect the CN with its backup VM
have 50% of the bandwidth of the working virtual link.
4.1.3 Physical node (i.e., datacenter) sharing for VM
backup location
The selected physical node to provide VM backup location
for one CN can be shared by another CN as working VM
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location and/or VM backup location. To increase the surviv-
ability to post-disaster failures, this approach will not allow
to share the same physical node if both CNs can be dis-
connected by the same disaster. VBL has the flexibility to
choose more than one physical node to relocate VMs based
on the demand (Fig 4(b)).
Fig. 4 Virtual backup node for VM backup location: (a) one VM
backup location per CN, (b) two VM backup locations per CN.
4.1.4 Example of VM backup location
By adding VBL into Min-Risk-DS approach (Fig. 4(a)), the
risk of disconnection of CN 1 (Fig. 3(b)) is reduced from
120 (note that we assume a penalty of disconnection of 400
and a pn is equal to 0.3, so 120 = 400×0.3) to 10 (30 of
penalty × 0.3). Thanks to our approach, the CN does not
get disconnectd, so the risk of CN disconnection is reduced
by 92% with an additional capacity of 30 Mbps (assuming 5
Mbps for each backup-virtual link).
As an example of two VM backup locations, in Fig. 4(b),
we add a third disaster zone, DZ3, with p3 = 0.5, which in-
creases the risk to 210 in the mapping of Fig. 4(a). Then, we
map a second virtual backup node which reduces the risk
to 28 or 91.4% because only independent virtual links can
be affected by disaster and the CN may remain connected.
Also, the CN may survive if a disaster and post-disaster dis-
connect two VMs and create additional physical-link fail-
ures.
4.2 Post-Disaster Survivability (PDS)
However, if a disaster in DZ1 occurs, a post-disaster-
correlated cascading failure of the physical link A - B will
still disconnect the CN of Fig. 4(a). Additionally, a post-
disaster failure of physical links A - B and F - G will discon-
nect the CN of Fig. 4(b). Hence, post-disaster survivability
(PDS) constraint is added in our model to increase the sur-
vivability during recovery periods, given the vulnerability of
CNs to post-disaster failures [14, 16]. Our (PDS) approach
consists of two functions: cut extension and a survivability
constraint.
Table 1 Example of basic and extended cuts
Basic cuts in Extended cuts in
Fig. 5(a) (VM 1 replaces VM 3 (Fig. 5(c))
(2-3)(2-5) (2-1)(2-5)
(2-5)(5-4) (2-5)(5-4)
(5-4)(4-3) (5-4)(4-1)
(3-2)(4-3) (1-2)(4-1)
(2-5)(4-3) (2-5)(4-1)
(3-2)(4-5) (1-2)(4-5)
(3-2)(4-5)(2-5) (1-2)(4-5)(2-5)
(3-4)(2-5)(5-4) (1-4)(2-5)(5-4)
(3-4)(2-5)(5-4)(2-3) (1-4)(2-5)(5-4)(2-1)
4.2.1 Cut extension
We implement a new algorithm called ExCuts, which is an
extension of the approach proposed in [22]. ExCuts extends
the basic cuts of the CN 1 topology in three steps. To de-
scribe the steps, we use CN 1 (Fig. 5(a)) and one possible
replacement of VM 3 by VM 1 (i.e., as virtual backup node).
Step i: ExCuts replaces the working VM 3 for VM 1 as
possible relocation and builds a new topology (Fig. 5(c)).
Fig. 5 Basic cuts, post-disaster cuts, and one VM backup location per
CN. (a) CN with basic cuts, (b) CN with one VM backup location and
(c - f) extended cuts for any replacement.
Step ii: ExCuts renumbers the basic cuts with virtual
links of the resulting topology of Fig. 5(c). In Table 1, we
show the basic and extended cuts of the resulting topology
when VM 3 is disconnected and replaced by VM 1.
Step iii: ExCuts eliminates redundant cuts and repeats
the three steps for each possible VM relocation of Fig. 5(c -
f).
In this example, we consider only one datacenter for VM
backup location. However, ExCuts will generate new cuts
considering all possible VM relocation given a disaster fail-
ure.
4.2.2 Survivability constraint
The extended cuts are input to the novel survivability con-
straint which enforces survivable mapping against any post-
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disaster single physical-link failure. The constraint applies
the concept of cut-disjoint approach introduced in Section 3
but considering post-failure cuts to increase the post-disaster
survivability. Figure 6 presents the cut extension of Fig. 5 for
two VM backup locations.
Fig. 6 Post-disaster cuts for two VM backup locations per CN. (a)
CN with two VM backup locations, and (b - g) extended cuts for the
replacement of the two failed VMs.
4.3 Example of Min-Risk-D-PDS Approach
In the mapping of Fig. 4(a), if a disaster, e.g., in DZ1, occurs,
the physical node C and its physical links will fail, but the
CN will not be disconnected, because the failed VM in node
2 will be relocated into physical node A (VM in node 1).
However, a post-disaster failure in physical link A - B will
disconnect the CN, because virtual links 1 - 5 and 1 - 4 will
be disconnected. Similarly, failure of any of physical-links
B - E, F - G, and E - G may disconnect the CN.
Min-Risk-D-PDS obtains the mapping in Fig. 7(a),
where the CN will not be disconnected by any single
physical-link failure, disaster failure, or post-disaster single
physical-link failure, and the expected loss of bandwidth and
processing capacity will be reduced.
Fig. 7 Resulting mapping by Min-Risk-D-PDS with (a) one and (b)
two VM backup locations.
5 ILP Formulation of Min-Risk-DS
In this section, we present the ILP formulation of the
baseline approach Min-Risk-DS which has three elements:
Min-Risk formulation, CN mapping, and survivability con-
straints. Before we describe the formulation, we introduce
the parameters and variables of the problem.
5.1 Variables and Symbols
Given
– G(V,E): Physical topology, where V is the set of physi-
cal nodes and E is the set of physical links.
– Vˆ : Set of VM datacenter locations, Vˆ ⊂V .
– Gγ(Vγ ,Eγ): Topology of CN γ where Vγ is the set of
working VM locations (virtual nodes, Vγ ⊂ Vˆ ), and Eγ
the set of virtual links of CN.
– Cγ : Set of basic cuts of CN topology γ .
– Eˆγ : Set of virtual links including the links in Eγ and vir-
tual links from each node inVγ to each node in
{
Vˆ −Vγ
}
– Cˆγ : Set of extended cuts of CN topology γ formed by a
possible relocation of working VM of Vγ to a physical
node b with free processing capacity in
{
Vˆ −Vγ
}
.
– Γ =
{
γ =<Vγ ,Eγ ,Cγ , Eˆγ ,Cˆγ ,
}
: Set of cloud networks
(CNs).
– sni, j: 1 if the physical link {i, j} is disconnected by disas-
ter n, zero otherwise.
– Sn:
{
sni, j,
}
, Sn ⊂ E.
– pn: Probability of occurrence of disaster n.
– N = {< Sn, pn >}: Set of disasters zones (i.e., DZs).
– Pγu : Processing capacity required to allocate VM u used
by CN γ (u ∈Vγ).
– Pvf ree: Excess processing capacity in physical node v.
– Fi, j: capacity of physical link (i, j).
– d: CN disconnection coefficient (1≥ d ≤ 10).
– be: Bandwidth requirement of virtual link e.
– bc: Total capacity that can be lost if the links of the cut c
are disconnected (i.e., the CN is disconnected).
– mc: Number of virtual links in cut c.
Binary variables
– Dne : 1 if virtual link e is disconnected by disaster n.
– Mei, j: 1 if virtual link e is mapped on physical link (i, j).
– Kγ,eu,v : 1 if virtual link e from node u to v in γ .
– Y γb : 1 if b is assigned as as virtual backup node of γ .
– Qnc : 1 if virtual links of the cut c is disconnected by dis-
aster n.
– Xnγ : 1 if CN γ may be disconnected by disaster n.
– T ng,h: is an auxiliary variable.
– Zγu,b: 1 if VM u can be relocated to datacenter b, b ∈ Vˆ .
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5.2 Min-Risk Formulation and Constraints
5.2.1 Objective function
The objective is to minimize the total capacity that can be
lost if a disaster occurs. The risk as defined in Section 4 is
the total penalty for capacity loss multiplied by the proba-
bility of occurrence. The total penalty for capacity lost is the
sum of penalty for CN and virtual links’ disconnections. The
penalty for CN disconnection is calculated by ∑
c∈Cγ
dQncbc
which is the sum of capacity bc that is lost if a CN is dis-
connected by disaster n multiplied by a CN disconnection
coefficient d. The penalty for virtual-link disconnection is
calculated by ∑
c∈Cγ
Dncbe which is the sum of capacity be that
is lost when virtual links e is disconnected by disaster n. Fi-
nally, the objective function is:
min∑
n∈N
∑
γ∈Γ
∑
c∈Cγ
dQncbc+ ∑
e∈Eˆγ
Dnebe
 pn
+
ε× ∑
(i, j)∈E
∑
γ∈Γ
∑
e∈Eˆγ
Mei, j×be
 (3)
To avoid the mapping of virtual links over long lightpaths,
a resource-minimization formula is added with a coefficient
ε . A very small value of ε will give more importance for risk
minimization in the mapping over resources used.
5.2.2 Constraint to determine whether a virtual link is
affected by a disaster
Dne ≥
1
M ∑
(i, j)∈E
sni, jM
e
i, j, ∀e ∈ Eˆγ ,γ ∈ Γ ,n ∈ N (4a)
Dne ≤ ∑
(i, j)∈E
sni, jM
e
i, j, ∀e ∈ Eˆγ ,γ ∈ Γ ,n ∈ N (4b)
where M is a large number.
5.2.3 Constraint to determine a CN disconnection (i.e., cut
failure) due to a disaster
Qnc ≤
∑
e∈Ec
Dne
mc
, ∀c ∈Cγ ,γ ∈ Γ ,n ∈ N (5a)
Qnc ≥ ∑
e∈Ec
Dne−mc+1, ∀c ∈Cγ ,γ ∈ Γ ,n ∈ N (5b)
The CN is disconnected when the value of Qnc is 1, i.e., dis-
aster n disconnects all the virtual links e (Dne) belonging to a
cut c.
5.3 CN Mapping Constraints
The basic constraints used in the mapping are:
5.3.1 Virtual-link mapping constraint
Kγ,eu,v = 1, ∀u,v ∈Vγ ,u 6= v,γ ∈ Γ ,e ∈ Eˆ (6)
This constraint maps the CN γ , connecting the VMs u and v.
5.3.2 Flow-conservation constraints
∑
(i,se)∈E
Mei,se − ∑
(se, j)∈E
Mese, j =−K
γ,e
se,de (7a)
∑
(i,de)∈E
Mei,de − ∑
(de, j)∈E
Mede, j = K
γ,e
se,de (7b)
∑
(k, j)∈E
Mek, j− ∑
(i,k)∈E
Mei,k = 0, ∀e ∈ Eˆγ ,γ ∈ Γ ,
k ∈ Vˆ −{se,de}
(7c)
These constraints ensure that each virtual link is mapped on
a lightpath, and it does not pass the same physical node more
than once.
5.3.3 Physical-link capacity constraint
∑
e∈Eˆγ
Mei, j ≤ Fi, j, ∀(i, j) ∈ E,γ ∈ Γ (8)
5.4 Survivability Contraint
The survivability constraint uses the basic cuts of the CN
topology Cγ . The constraint enforces that all links (mc) of
the cut c do not use the same physical link.
∑
e∈Ec
Mei, j ≤ mc−1,∀c ∈Cγ ,γ ∈ Γ ,(i, j) ∈ E (9)
6 ILP Formulation of Min-Risk-D-PDS
Min-Risk-D-PDS is our comprehensive approach which ex-
tends the ILP formulation of the baseline approach Min-
Risk-DS by adding the VM backup location (VBL) and
post-disaster survivability (PDS) constraints.
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6.1 VBL Constraints
6.1.1 Disaster-disjoint VM backup location constraint
This set of constraints enforces that two or more CNs do not
share the same physical node as VM backup location if the
CNs are affected by the same disaster (Eqs. (10), (11), and
(12)). Equation (10) identifies which disaster n disconnects
the CN γ , giving value 1 to Xnγ , 0 otherwise.
Xnγ ≥
1
M ∑c∈Cγ
Qnc , X
n
γ ≤ ∑
c∈Cγ
Qnc , ∀γ ∈ Γ ,n ∈ N (10)
Equation (11) uses the value of Xnγ and an auxiliary variable
T ng,h to identify the disaster which disconnect CNs h and g.
T ng,h ≤ Xng , T ng,h ≤ Xnh , ∀g,h ∈ Γ ,g 6= h,n ∈ N (11a)
T ng,h ≥ Xng +Xnh −1, ∀g,h ∈ Γ ,g 6= h,n ∈ N (11b)
Equation (12) restricts two CNs (g and h) to share the same
physical node (b) for VM backup location if both CNs are
disconnected by the same disaster.
Y gb +Y
h
b ≤ 2−T ng,h, ∀g,h ∈ Γ ,g 6= h,n ∈ N,
b ∈ [Vˆ − (Vg∪Vh)] (12)
6.1.2 Mapping of VM backup location constraint
This constraint gives the bound for the number of VM
backup location per CN. It has two set of equations: VM
backup location selection and bound on number of VM lo-
cation per CN. Equation (13) chooses the less-risky VM
backup location b for each CN γ . Equation (13a) ensures
that the VM backup location b will not be chosen from the
working VM Vγ of CN γ .
Y γb = 0, ∀b ∈Vγ ,γ ∈ Γ (13a)
Y γb ≥ ∑
(u∈Vγ
Zγu,b
M
,∀b ∈ (Vˆ −Vγ),γ ∈ Γ ,u ∈ E (13b)
Y γb ≤ ∑
u∈Vγ
Zγu,b,∀b ∈ (Vˆ −Vγ),γ ∈ Γ (13c)
Equation (14) bounds the number of VM backup location
between 2 and certain maximum number.
∑
b∈(Vˆ−Vγ )
Y γb ≥ 2, ∑
b∈(Vˆ−Vγ )
Y γb ≤ |Vγ |,∀γ ∈ Γ (14)
6.1.3 Connecting the VM backup node for relocation
When VM backup location is selected, virtual links connect
it to working VMs (Eq. (15)). The connection follows two
conditions:
(i) When one or more VMs chose a VM backup loca-
tion. In this regard, Zγv,b is 1, meaning that working VM used
by CN in physical node v chose to be relocated to physical
node b. As a result, the variable Kγ,ev,b will be 1, forcing the
mapping of virtual link e into the physical network.
(ii) When the VM backup location mapped in b is al-
ready connected to v, (Kγ,ev,b = 1), and the VM in physical
node u is neighbor of v. Hence, a virtual link connects one
working VM u with a VM backup location b of the same CN
(Kγ,eu,b = 1).
Kγ,eu,b ≤ Zγv,b,Kγ,eu,b ≤ Kγ,ev,u ,Kγ,eu,b ≥ Zγv,b+Kγ,ev,u −1 (15a)
Kγ,eu,b = Z
γ
v,b ∀v,u ∈Vγ ,(b ∈ (Vˆ −Vγ),γ ∈ Γ (15b)
6.2 Processing Capacity Required for VM Backup Location
This constraint manages the free capacity of each physical
node used for VM backup location. If Pbf ree is zero, the phys-
ical node (Y γb =0) cannot be used (e.g., the required capacity
of the CN (Pγu ) is higher or the free capacity (Pbf ree) is not
enough.
Pbf ree− ∑
u∈Vγ
Pγu .Y
γ
b ≥ 0 (16)
6.3 PDS Constraint
PDS uses the same formulation presented in Eq. (9) with the
extended cuts Cˆγb as additional input.
7 Illustrative Examples
7.1 Experimental Setup
We test our approaches on a 24-node US mesh opaque
WDM optical network (Fig. 8(b)) with 32 wavelengths per
link. Two types of disasters are considered: natural disas-
ters (earthquake), and human-made disasters (weapons-of-
mass-destruction (WMD) attacks), originally modeled in
[17] and shown in Fig. 8(b). For earthquakes, the probability
of occurrence and damage are obtained with seismic hazard
maps. And for WMD attacks, the probability of attack and
damage are based on cities population and importance [17].
We consider five full-mesh cloud networks (CNs), each
consisting of four virtual nodes (i.e., VMs) distributed over
16 datacenters (Fig. 8(a)). We assume that each virtual link
requires a full lightpath (i.e., wavelength channels), and each
datacenter has enough processing capacity.
7.2 Survivable CN Mapping Approaches
We tested eight approaches: four minimizing resources
(Min-Res) and four minimizing risk (Min-Risk). All ap-
proaches use a set of baseline survivability constraints (SC).
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Fig. 8 (a) CNs studied and (b) physical topology with disaster zones
for earthquake and potential WMD attacks [17], and datacenter loca-
tions.
Table 2 Approaches used in illustrative examples
Name Approach PDS VBL Cuts
RESA Min-Res Basic
RISKA Min-Risk-DS Basic
RESA-1L Min-Res-DS-1L 1L Basic
RISKA-1L Min-Risk-DS-1L 1L Basic
RESA-PDS Min-Res-D-PDS X 1L Extended
RISKA-PDS Min-Risk-D-PDS X 1L Extended
RESA-2L Min-Res-D-PDS-2L X 2L Extended
RISKA-2L Min-Risk-D-PDS-2L X 2L Extended
Some of them use a disaster survivable mapping (DS), dis-
aster and post-disaster survivable constraints (D-PDS), and
VM backup location (VBL) with number of backup loca-
tion: one (1L) or two (2L). Min-Res-DS-1L indicates min-
imization of resources, disaster survivable mapping with 1
VM backup location which we call RESA-1L. The list of
approaches is presented in Table 2 including our proposed
approaches.
7.3 Evaluation and Comparative Methodologies
Our examples are evaluated using risk and penalty, disaster
and post-disaster survivability, and resource usage analysis.
7.3.1 Risk and penalty
The risk of CN disconnection is evaluated using the first part
of Eq. (3). The penalty for capacity loss is the total capacity
that can be lost due to a disaster.
Table 3 Simulated failures
Post-disaster failures
Symbols Description Disaster Physical link/s Disaster
DF Any single disaster Single - -
occurs
DSLF One physical link fails Single Single -
after a disaster
DDLF Two physical links fail Single Dual -
after a disaster
DFDF Second disaster occurs Single - Single
after a disaster
7.3.2 Disaster and post-disaster survivability analysis
The second analysis is the evaluation of the probability
of CN disconnection (PoD). The PoD is calculated by an
algorithm called cloud-network resiliency test algorithm
(CNRT) which tests the vulnerability of the CN to all pos-
sible combinations of disaster and post-disaster failures.
CNRT gets the mapping of each CN and simulates disas-
ter damage over the physical infrastructure based on given
disaster scenarios (Table 3). Then, the algorithm tests the
connectivity of every VM and counts the number of possi-
ble failure scenarios caused by a disaster in which the CN is
disconnected. With these numbers, CNRT obtains one PoD
for each CN and type of failure using Eq. (17).
PoD=
Total Number CN Disconnection
Total Number o f Possible Failures
(17)
7.4 Numerical Analysis
To study the risk and penalty, we use the mapping of the
five CNs presented in Fig. 8(a). However, we select CN 1
for earthquake and CN 3 for WMD to study the disaster and
post-disaster scenarios, as these two CNs are more affected
by the disasters.
7.4.1 Risk and penalty analysis
Figure 9 compares the expected risk of CN disconnection of
different approaches. In Fig. 9 we observe that:
(i) RISKA approach reduces the risk of CN disconnec-
tion and penalty by 2.75% to 3.77%. These results shows a
low risk reduction without VBL constraint, and the limita-
tion of SVNM based approaches to deal with disaster and
post-disaster failures.
(ii) By adding the VM backup location (VBL), RISKA-
1L approach reduces the risk of CN disconnection and
penalty up to 87% for earthquake, and up to 88% for WMD.
Also, RESA-1L approach reduces risk up to 85% for earth-
quake, and up to 87% for WMD. It confirms that VBL
approach reduces considerably the CN disconnection and
penalty for capacity loss. However, VBL works better with
RISKA (risk and penalty reduction by 10% to 30%).
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Fig. 9 Risk of CN disconnection (a) earthquake and (b) weapon of
mass destruction (WMD).
(iii) PDS constraint slightly increases the risk because
the extended cuts force virtual links to be mapped in longer
lightpaths. However, PDS constraint increases survivability
against post-disaster failures by 60% to 100% (Table 4).
(iv) The combination of PDS and VBL with two VM
backup locations per CN obtains more reduction in risk and
penalty. However, the risk and penalty reduction tend to be
lower in earthquake case and higher for WMD for one VM
backup location per CN.
7.4.2 Disaster and post-disaster survivability study
After risk and penalty analysis, we study the probability of
disconnection (PoD) due to a disaster failure and three kind
of post-disaster failures presented in Table 3.
Table 4 presents the PoD of CN 1 and CN 3. We observe
that:
(i) DF: CNs with VBL will completely survive any fail-
ure as any VM can be relocated from one datacenter to an-
other i.e., PoD = 0. In addition, RISKA approach increases
the survivability by 50% in WMD case compared to RESA
approach.
(ii) DSLF: RISKA approach reduces PoD by 0% to
22% compared to RESA approach. And, RISKA-1L (i.e.,
with VBL) increases the survivability by 37% to 100%
compared to RESKA-based approaches. PDS constraint in-
creases the survivability to 100% independent of the number
of VM backup locations and the objective function (RISKA
or RESA).
(iii) DDLF: RISKA achieves a reduction of PoD by
2.3% in WMD case and 16% in earthquake case compared
Table 4 Probability of Disconnection (PoD)
Approach CN 1 - Earthquake CN 3 - WMD attack
DF DSLF DF DSLF
RESA 0.27 0.45 0.18 0.38
RISKA 0.27 0.35 0.09 0.38
RESA-1L 0 0.30 0 0.29
RISKA-1L 0 0.26 0 0.20
RESA-PDS 0 0 0 0.14
RISKA-PDS 0 0 0 0
RESA-2L 0 0 0 0
RISKA-2L 0 0 0 0
DDLF DFDF DDLF DFDF
RESA 0.50 0.52 0.42 0.35
RISKA 0.42 0.49 0.41 0.22
RESA-1L 0.38 0.19 0.35 0.04
RISKA-1L 0.35 0.11 0.24 0.02
RESA-PDS 0.35 0.13 0.17 0
RISKA-PDS 0.20 0.13 0.15 0
RESA-2L 0.23 0.01 0.17 0
RISKA-2L 0.20 0 0.15 0
to RESA. However, when VBL is used, the reduction of PoD
is higher (between 24% and 64%). PDS constraint has posi-
tive impact, because the reduction is higher for RISKA-PDS
compared to other approaches without PDS constraints.
(iv) DFDF: VBL reduces the PoD remarkably by 78% to
100%. Also, including PDS constraint with RISKA-based
approach does not enhance the performance significantly.
However, RESA-based approaches with PDS achieve an im-
portant reduction of 33% in PoD.
7.4.3 Resource consumption analysis
In this analysis, we study the resources used to provide re-
duction in risk, penalty for capacity loss, and PoD. From the
previous analysis and the results of Fig. 10, we observe that:
(i) RISKA-based approaches require additional re-
sources by 7.8% to 16% to reduce the risk and penalty and
PoD. RISKA with VBL constraints increases resource usage
by 16% to 37% for one VM backup location (RISKA-1L) to
provide risk and penalty reduction by 85% to 87%, and a
reduction of the PoD by 24% to 100% (i.e., increasing the
survivability by 24% to 100%). This results confirms that
SVNM cannot deal with disasters and their consequences.
(ii) PDS constraint with RISKA and VM backup loca-
tion (RISKA-PDS) increase the resources by 25% to 50% in
CN 1 (earthquake) and by 23% to 38% for CN 3 (WMD).
However, the risk and penalty are reduced up to 88%, and
the survivability increase up to 100% in cases of disaster
and post-disaster failures.
(iii) Two VM backup locations require more resources,
but increase the survivability for more severe disaster sce-
narios which may disconnect two VMs.
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Fig. 10 Resources used (in Mbps) by the mapping of (a) CN 1 in earth-
quake case (b) CN 3 in WMD case.
8 Conclusion
We studied the disaster and post-disaster survivable cloud-
network (CN) mapping problem. We proposed a CN map-
ping approach Min-Risk-D-PDS using (i) VM backup loca-
tion for each CN (VBL) and (ii) post-disaster survivability
constraint (PDS), which offer an economically-sustainable
disaster and post-disaster survivable CN mapping approach.
We formulated the Min-Risk-D-PDS as an integer linear
program. We compared our approach with seven different
approaches characterized by different combinations of VBL
and PDS constraints with risk and resources minimization
as objective function.
Results on a case study formed by five CNs mapped over
a US network and two disaster cases (earthquake and WMD)
showed that Min-Risk-D-PDS (RISKA-PDS) reduces the
risk of CN disconnections and penalty for capacity loss by
85% to 90%. As a consequence, our approach increases the
CN survivability by 60% and 100% against three kind of
post-disaster failures with the cost of 23% to 50% of addi-
tional resources usage.
Hence, our illustrative examples confirm the importance
of VM backup location and post-disaster survivability con-
straints for CN survivability against any disaster and post-
disaster correlated, cascading failures that may occur in the
network.
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